

# Taking Down the Wall and the Curtain: Historical Context and the Soviet Acquiescence in German Reunification

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The period between 1985 and 1995 was one of heightened emotions. The reforms of the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, took the world by surprise and launched a series of events that changed the face of Europe. The new policies allowed for independence movements to emerge and the discussion of German reunification to arise in international politics. As General Secretary during a time of reform, Gorbachev had many decisions to make: How could he fix the economic, political, and social problems within his own borders while maintaining a hold on Eastern Germany? Gorbachev had to choose between being in control of a weak, but vast empire, or giving up his monopoly and asking the European Community for aid. Gorbachev gave up Eastern Germany to save a dying country and, in doing so, precipitated a change that no one could forget or expect: Under his leadership, Gorbachev changed the face of Europe.

In order to gain a greater perspective on the magnitude of these events, an evaluation of the historical context is necessary. For many years, the people of the Soviet Union (USSR) lived under a pall of oppression. Conservative dictators ensured their orders were followed through the threat of violence. Starting in 1985, the threat of violence and political oppression began to dissipate. Once the veil of deception woven by the previous administration had been lifted, it was clear that the Soviet Union was in a state of economic, political, and social turmoil. Gorbachev could no longer implement policies that enhanced the State but, instead, his policies focused on enhancing the lives of the people in the Soviet Union. Economic salvation was the problem and Gorbachev looked to Western aid for the solution. In order to save the people of Russia, Gorbachev had to relinquish his hold on the continued division of East and West Germany; Gorbachev realized in the early 1990s that only by letting go of Germany could he hold on to the ideals of his reforms.<sup>1</sup>

Before looking at the historical events during this period, it is important to note the economic situation in the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union's economy was meager, at best; there were high unemployment rates and poor working conditions for those who were employed.<sup>2</sup> Subsistence levels were lacking as government spending was primarily directed to military defense; the

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<sup>1</sup> Condoleezza Rice, interview by Alexander von Plato, Stanford University, 17 September 17 1999.

<sup>2</sup> Walter G. Moss, *A History of Russia: Since 1855* (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 431.

Soviet Union wanted to maintain their military strength so as not to be overcome by the United States.<sup>3</sup> Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was one of the world's biggest producers of steel, raw materials, fuel, and grain, the inefficiency of the industries meant that these products were wasted.<sup>4</sup> The Soviet Union could not keep up with technological advancements that would have been able to make use of these items being produced.<sup>5</sup> By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union depended on imports to sustain their economy.<sup>6</sup> Black market activities during this time were tolerated for the simple fact that the government could not provide the goods needed to survive.<sup>7</sup> This period of economic crises was the backdrop to the historical events to follow.

After the Second World War, Germany was divided along ideological lines. When tensions broke out between the communist East and the capitalist West, the two German States were divided similarly.<sup>8</sup> After the war, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became economically dependent on the Soviet Union whereas the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was able to reduce its interdependency on the Soviet Union because of its ties with the West.<sup>9</sup> With the implementation of the deutsche mark in the West, the FRG gained financial leverage over the GDR leading to confrontations between their Eastern and Western allies.<sup>10</sup>

The dissidence movements in the USSR, which began as early as the 1940s, are crucial to understanding events in the 1980s because they provided the precedents to the movements that led to the fall of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany. The guerrilla movements in the Baltic States, the suppression of Hungarian and, later, the Czechoslovakian<sup>11</sup> reforms all constitute the backdrop to Soviet repression and the buildup of dissidence within the Soviet Union. A failed attempt at détente during the 1970s also led to increased tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States until the 1980s. By 1981, the foreign policy of the government began to change when the Soviet leaders realized that they could no longer maintain their military hold on the Soviet Union.

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<sup>3</sup> Moss, 431.

<sup>4</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987), 21.

<sup>5</sup> Gorbachev, 19.

<sup>6</sup> Moss, 432.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> Randall Newnham, *Deutsche Mark Diplomacy: Positive Economic Sanctions in German-Russian Relations* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 108.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>11</sup> Known as the Prague Spring.

During the Second World War, the Soviet Union annexed Western Ukraine, South East Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.<sup>12</sup> In these war-torn countries, guerrilla movements emerged to fight Soviet oppression.<sup>13</sup> In 1975, the Helsinki Watch Group was established in Ukraine under Mykola Rudenko who sought connections in other Soviet countries to increase awareness of human rights infractions.<sup>14</sup> The Baltic States fought the Soviet Union for independence up until the late 1980s under the Gorbachev administration when Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine.<sup>15</sup>

In 1956, Hungarian demonstrators petitioned for the removal of Soviet troops and the reinstatement of the previously ousted Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy.<sup>16</sup> On November 24, Imre Nagy returned to office and Soviet troops entered Budapest to put a halt to anti-Soviet demonstrations.<sup>17</sup> Soviet intervention only incited the demonstrators more and the Soviet administration under General Secretary of the Communist Party Nikita Khrushchev pulled the troops out for renegotiation.<sup>18</sup> The negotiations ended when Nagy announced that Hungary would restore multiparty democracy, withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and become a neutral state.<sup>19</sup> From November 4 to the 14, Soviet troops poured back in to Hungary and silenced all opposition to the Soviet Union.<sup>20</sup> In 1958, Nagy was executed for his crimes against the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup>

In 1967, Antonín Navotny, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, was overthrown, with the approval of the Soviet government, due to his extreme conservatism and rising Czechoslovakian dissent.<sup>22</sup> He was replaced by Alexander Dubček in January of 1968.<sup>23</sup> Dubček, along with the President, Ludvík Svoboda, began to implement an idea of “Socialism with a human face” by introducing civil liberties like freedom of expression.<sup>24</sup> The Soviet government also feared that Czechoslovakia would turn to Western

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<sup>12</sup> Moss, 315.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s.v. “Helsinki Watch Group,” accessed 14 March 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/libproxy.uwinnipeg.ca/EBchecked/topic/260626/Helsinki-Watch-Group>.

<sup>15</sup> To be discussed below.

<sup>16</sup> Moss, 414.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 439.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

Germany to build up their economy.<sup>25</sup> This fear was realized when the leaders in Prague gave the Soviet government an ultimatum: either you provide a loan or we will find it elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> The Soviet administration, under General Secretary of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev, did not take too kindly to the threat and, on the night of August 20, Prague was invaded by troops from several Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>27</sup> This event ended the Prague Spring.<sup>28</sup> This was an important event in the history of the Soviet Union for a number of reasons. For one thing, it demonstrated that Brezhnev was willing to use force to contain independence movements. Brezhnev's policies in Czechoslovakia were expressions of the unofficial Brezhnev Doctrine where he announced that "each Communist party is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire Communist movement. . . . The sovereignty of each socialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism."<sup>29</sup> For another thing, the Prague Spring aroused dissidence throughout the USSR, often seen in literature, and weakened Communism on an international level.<sup>30</sup>

The swift and horrifying manner in which the Soviet Union dealt with these demonstrations plagued the minds of demonstrators for years to come. The Soviet Union was a military force that was quick to judge and administer punishment. When Gorbachev announced that he would no longer be taking military action against demonstrators, reformist movements emerged to change Europe forever.

The 1970s saw the rise and fall of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. Richard Nixon, U.S. President from 1969-1974, called for a period of negotiations in the hope of peace between the Soviet Union and the United States; détente was seen as a way to neutralize ideological and military differences between the two countries to co-exist peacefully.<sup>31</sup> According to Raymond L. Garthoff, Cold War and arms control specialist, both the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States saw détente as quelling the other's sense of power and superiority.<sup>32</sup> Détente officially started with a summit meeting in

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<sup>25</sup> Michael J. Sodaro, *Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 112.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>27</sup> Moss, 440.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 439.

<sup>29</sup> Leonid Brezhnev, *Pravda*, 25 September 1968, translated by Novosti, Soviet press agency, reprinted in L. S. Stavrianos, *The Epic of Man* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971), 465-6.

<sup>30</sup> Moss, 441.

<sup>31</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, "Détente and Confrontation: American Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan," *National Council of Soviet and East European Research* (December 1982), 7, 15.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

Moscow, 1972, between Nixon and Brezhnev.<sup>33</sup> In reality, détente began with the meeting in Helsinki, 1969, with the initiation of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); negotiations for SALT lasted until 1972.<sup>34</sup> SALT was the first attempt to control strategic nuclear weaponry, a nation's most powerful defense.<sup>35</sup> The idea that arms control cannot in and of itself, bear the burden of political differences as exhibited by the failure of SALT II.<sup>36</sup> Garthoff states that détente was

An agreement on mutual accommodation to political competition in which each side would limit its action in important (but unfortunately not well defined) ways in recognition of the common shared interest in avoiding the risks of uncontrolled confrontation. It called for political adjustments, both negotiated and unilateral. It did not involve a classical division of the world into spheres of hegemonic geopolitical interest, but it was a compact calling for self-restraint on each side in recognition of the interests of the other to the extent necessary to prevent the sharp tensions of confrontation.<sup>37</sup>

Garthoff provides several reasons for the failure of détente which can be summarized by the fact that each side could not understand the differing perspectives and perceptions of the other.<sup>38</sup> Beginning in 1975, détente policies began to fail and tensions rose until the early 1980s.<sup>39</sup>

In the 1980s, under the Brezhnev administration, financial constraints were becoming more prominent which led to the Soviet Union's inability to intercede during dissidence movements. The first to prosper was an independent labour union, known as Solidarity, which opposed the edicts of the Communist Party; although Solidarity formed earlier, they did not become an official union until 1980.<sup>40</sup> The weakened Communist government could not contain the mass movement against them and, in December of 1981, party leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski established martial law to outlaw the Solidarity movement.<sup>41</sup> Despite General Jaruzelski's fear that the Soviet government would intervene as it had

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas G. Paterson, *American Foreign Relations - A History* (Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010), 376.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 36-7.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>40</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s.v. "Solidarity," accessed 14 March 2013, <http://www.britannica.com/libproxy.uwinnipeg.ca/EBchecked/topic/553374/Solidarity>. The Union was recognized in 1980 although it began prior to that date.

<sup>41</sup> Moss, 449.

done in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Politburo agreed that such an action would be too costly on an economic, political, and diplomatic basis.<sup>42</sup>

As the Cold War continued, an increasing amount of the Soviet Union's national income went to military spending and less to economic improvement.<sup>43</sup> When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985, he inherited a broken country. Over the next few years, Gorbachev would implement a number of policies that he hoped would reform the economy of the Soviet Union.<sup>44</sup> Before Gorbachev could launch radical changes in domestic and foreign policies, however, he had to consolidate his power.<sup>45</sup> To do so, he had to prove that his ideas were sound and get the support of the populace and the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. To do so, Gorbachev made a number of personnel changes to his staff. Gorbachev introduced more reformist and moderate officials to replace the conservative ones.<sup>46</sup> In March of 1986, Aleksandr Yakovlov was given control of the Central Committee Foreign Information Department and by 1988 was responsible for the entire International Department.<sup>47</sup> In July 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze became the foreign minister, replacing long-term Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko.<sup>48</sup> By 1986, the majority of the Soviet administration was new.<sup>49</sup> With stronger allies in his administration, Gorbachev could start effecting changes in his domestic policies before addressing the international scene.

In 1986, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze implemented a policy of New Political Thinking which sought to communicate reforms in the domestic and foreign arenas.<sup>50</sup> Only through domestic reforms could foreign policy be changed.<sup>51</sup> At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev announced: "Comrades, the acceleration of the country's socioeconomic development holds the key to all our problems in the near and more distant future

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<sup>42</sup> In a recent interview, Jaruzelski claimed that he instituted martial law to prevent Soviet intervention despite popular claims that he was working with Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov. Jaruzelski insists that the claims were falsely interpreted. Wojciech Jaruzelski, interview by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 12 December 2009; Moss, 449.

<sup>43</sup> Moss, 431.

<sup>44</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 27.

<sup>45</sup> Sarah E. Mendelson, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," *World Politics* 45/3 (April 1993): 345.

<sup>46</sup> David H. Shumaker, *Gorbachev and the German Question: Soviet-West German Relations, 1985-1990* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 9-10.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>49</sup> Mendelson, 350.

<sup>50</sup> Angela Stent, *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 42-3.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

– economic and social, political and ideological, internal and external ones”.<sup>52</sup> Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking allowed for more flexibility and, hopefully, a more fully functioning economic society.<sup>53</sup> Gorbachev’s plan was to transform society by modernizing the economy; he wanted to transfer much-needed resources to the civil sectors of society through technological innovations.<sup>54</sup> His policies of perestroika and glasnost were the imperative for his plan to restructure Soviet society.

In his book, *Perestroika*, Gorbachev stressed the fact that his changes did not stem from the idea that socialism, itself, was failing.<sup>55</sup> Instead, he ascribed the poor state of the Soviet Union to failures of the previous governments to “apply the principles of socialism consistently.”<sup>56</sup> The people under the Soviet government were poor, unhealthy, and hostile towards the regime. Gorbachev realized that something had to be done to rectify past mistakes and misunderstandings.<sup>57</sup> Gorbachev looked back to the teachings of Lenin to form the basis of his reforms.<sup>58</sup> The goal of these reforms was to raise social responsibility and quality of living for the mind, body, and soul.<sup>59</sup> He wanted to return to the socialist precept “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.”<sup>60</sup> To do this, democratization of all aspects of society was necessary.<sup>61</sup> Gorbachev explained that it was not unusual for the Soviet Union to act in a revolutionary fashion for the betterment of society and a revolution was what was required to change from authoritarianism to socialism.<sup>62</sup>

According to Gorbachev’s interpretation of Lenin, socialism and democracy were indivisible.<sup>63</sup> Only by gaining the freedom that democracy provided can the working class gain enough power to live in a socialist society.<sup>64</sup> With this in mind, Gorbachev and his senior advisor, Yakovlev, proposed the idea of perestroika to the 1985 plenary Meeting of the Central Committee.<sup>65</sup> In his book, Gorbachev defined perestroika as embodying six qualities:

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<sup>52</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, *Pravda*, 26 February 1986, as translated in Mendelson, 343.

<sup>53</sup> Stent, 44.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>55</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 37.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 30-31.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 31. It is important to note that the original statement popularized by Karl Marx was “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. It is unclear why Gorbachev chose to change the last word.

<sup>61</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 33.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

Perestroika means [. . .] creating a dependable and effective mechanism for the acceleration of social and economic progress. [. . .] Perestroika means [. . .] utmost respect for the individual and consideration for personal dignity [through] the comprehensive development of democracy. Perestroika is the all-around intensification of the Soviet economy [. . .] and the overall encouragement of innovation and socialist enterprise. Perestroika [. . .] means the combination of the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with a planned economy. Perestroika [. . .] means unceasing concern for cultural and spiritual wealth, for the culture of every individual and society as a whole. Perestroika means the elimination from society of the distortions of socialist ethics, the consistent implementation of the principles of social justice.<sup>66</sup>

In essence, perestroika was a mass initiative to improve the lives of the people of the Soviet Union through economic, social, political, and moral reforms.<sup>67</sup>

There were several measurements implemented under perestroika including the idea of glasnost, or freedom of expression.<sup>68</sup> Glasnost provided a voice for independent movements across Europe. It emphasized the decrease in government secrecy and censorship and allowed people to criticize the Soviet government without fear of punishment.<sup>69</sup> Other measurements included an emphasis on technical refurbishment of enterprises, saving resources, increasing the quality of goods being produced, as well as the ability to sell surplus in an open market.<sup>70</sup> In 1987, Gorbachev also implemented the Enterprise Law that placed an emphasis on self-management in businesses that previously relied on a centralized system.<sup>71</sup>

Gorbachev had many domestic problems to contend with before really looking for change elsewhere. The period between 1985 and 1990 was riddled with bad luck and poorly planned economic schemes. Throughout 1985 to 1987, bad weather led to poor crop yields. In 1986, the Chernobyl disaster meant cleaning up nuclear waste and increased dissent over Moscow's apparent indifference to pollution.<sup>72</sup> It also meant that Gorbachev had to be more forthcoming with Western governments and international ecological

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<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 34-35.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>68</sup> Moss, 458.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 28-29; Moss, 459.

<sup>71</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 34.

<sup>72</sup> Moss, 463.

movements.<sup>73</sup> Not only were some of Gorbachev's economic plans seemingly temporary and inconsistent but many of the more conservative leaders and businessmen resisted the economic plans and created a more complex atmosphere that required compromise on the part of Gorbachev.<sup>74</sup> For example, the legalization of cooperatives or small-scale private ownership, of enterprises (companies) in 1988 led to an increase in prices for goods which led to a suspicion of greed.<sup>75</sup> Black marketeering and political graft did not help the image of these cooperatives.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, the Enterprise Law put power into the hands of the enterprises but a dramatic increase in workers' wages led to inflation in the economy.<sup>77</sup> In all, the economy during the mid-1980s was characterized by "inflation, budget deficits, unemployment, shortages, bargaining, and rationing."<sup>78</sup>

In order to grow economically, the Soviet Union needed stronger, more economically sound allies. Gorbachev had to gain the respect of the West and, to do that, needed to demonstrate his willingness to compromise and change for the benefit of his people. Gorbachev rejected the notion that the communist East could not maintain political dialogue with the capitalist West.<sup>79</sup> Gorbachev longed for a "Common European Home" to stop the isolation of the Soviet countries.<sup>80</sup> Gorbachev insisted that the Soviet Union shared the same values as the west: democracy, individual liberty, and freedom.<sup>81</sup> Gorbachev realized that Europe was a patchwork of many nations with the same basic history, struggles, and needs.<sup>82</sup> Each country may have different traditions and problems, but essentially they should cooperate as one.<sup>83</sup> Gorbachev insisted that the Common European Home was a combination of necessity and opportunity.<sup>84</sup> In his public address in Prague on April 10, 1987, Gorbachev announced his plan for the Common European Home to much applause.

There were still many questions about the Common European Home which Gorbachev's contemporaries were quick to point out. In an interview with Professor Condoleezza Rice, she stated "[C]learly he had in mind, that this Common European Home would include the United States. But that it would also

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<sup>73</sup> Stent, 70.

<sup>74</sup> Moss, 468.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 469.

<sup>79</sup> Stent, 44.

<sup>80</sup> Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 18.

<sup>81</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev in *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>82</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 195.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

include a kind of Leninist Soviet Union — that is a Soviet Union that was not a threat to its neighbours, but that was respected.”<sup>85</sup> Here, Rice emphasized the importance of the United States to the Common European Home.<sup>86</sup> She also alluded to the ideological underpinnings of Gorbachev’s vision. U.S. President George Bush Sr. outlined a policy for the “commonwealth of free nations,” in which he was explicit that in order to overcome European disunity, Germany must first be unified, and only then could the Soviet Union join in international diplomacy.<sup>87</sup> In a conference in the Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, 1989, Bush stated: “The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole. Today it is this very concept of a divided Europe that is under siege. [. . .] there cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to move from room to room.”<sup>88</sup> Bush pointed out the flaws in Gorbachev’s plan for Europe: A united Europe was not possible while Germany remained divided.

As late as 1987, Gorbachev maintained that “all these statements about the revival of ‘German unity’ are far from being ‘Realpolitik’.”<sup>89</sup> He continued by stating that “there are two German states with different social and political systems. Each of them has values of its own. Both of them have drawn lessons from history, and each of them can contribute to the affairs of Europe and the world. And what there will be in a hundred years is for history to decide.”<sup>90</sup>

Clearly, Gorbachev did not expect German reunification to happen anytime soon but the German question was not going away and Gorbachev not only had to deal with it but also deal with a country in turmoil.

Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to get the Soviet Union on the international scene, but to do so, required repairing its relations with the most dominant of the world players: the West. The Soviet Union and the West had had tense relations since the end of the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War, the U.S. had the desire to contain Communism in the East.<sup>91</sup> This idea of containment went through various phases of intensity that eventually led to the desire of the U.S. to extinguish any Communist threat all over the world.<sup>92</sup> Ronald Reagan,

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<sup>85</sup> Rice interview.

<sup>86</sup> It is important to note that Gorbachev also included the United States in his vision for Europe. *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> Alexander von Plato, translation from the book *Die Vereinigung Deutschlands - ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Berlin: 2010), 20.

<sup>88</sup> George Bush Sr. in Zelikow and Rice, 31.

<sup>89</sup> Gorbachev, *Perestroika*, 200.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Harry S. Truman, *Transcript of the Truman Doctrine*, 1947, courtesy of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=81&page=transcript>.

<sup>92</sup> Oftentimes, writers will confuse the individual policies of containment and globalism and assume they are synonymous. Globalism, however, is a policy in which the U.S. will counter any Communist directive; this definition can be found in the document, NSC-68; globalism is often thought of as an expansion of containment. Containment, moreover, was a policy where the U.S.

President of the U.S. from 1981 to 1989, was particularly determined to eradicate Communism, the “evil empire.”<sup>93</sup> Reagan gave the Soviet Union no quarter when it came to negotiations. In 1983, Reagan implemented a new weapons system, known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which could detect and destroy any Soviet missiles launched at America from space.<sup>94</sup> Unable to match this military technology, Gorbachev wanted the SDI terminated and at first refused to consider détente objectives until his demands were met.<sup>95</sup> This period was one of the most uncertain for U.S.-Soviet relations.

The negotiations for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty were also slow to start. Beginning in 1981, the Soviet Union wanted to stop the modernization plans of the British and French forces while ameliorating the negative image of the SS-20 missiles in the Soviet military.<sup>96</sup> The Soviet Union made the case that the SS-20 missiles could be off-set by the British and French submarine-launched missiles and therefore no other NATO land-based missiles were necessary.<sup>97</sup> The administration of the United States insisted on a “zero-zero” option in which the NATO missiles would be cancelled if all SS-20 missiles were dismantled.<sup>98</sup> Neither the Brezhnev nor the Yuri Andropov administrations would accept such an option.<sup>99</sup> When Gorbachev came to power, he had similar reservations about the INF treaty, especially with the continuation of the SDI in the United States and Europe.<sup>100</sup> By February 28, 1987, Gorbachev agreed to negotiate the INF treaty without the renunciation of the SDI.<sup>101</sup> By December of the same year, the INF treaty was signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan and is considered a historic milestone; East-West relations rapidly improved thereafter.<sup>102</sup> The INF treaty and general armament reductions were the most successful part of Gorbachev’s career.

Gorbachev not only solidified Western relations by decreasing arms, he also sought to increase relations by diminishing the Soviet presence in Afghanistan which was one of the reasons détente failed in the 1970s. At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, Gorbachev referred to the Afghanistan conflict

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only countered Communist initiative in politically important locations; containment was suggested by George F. Kennan. Although it is important to note the difference between containment and globalism, for the purposes of this essay, I use containment synonymously with globalism.

<sup>93</sup> Sodaro, 280.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 323.

<sup>96</sup> Alan B. Sherr, *The Other Side of Arms Control: Soviet Objectives in the Gorbachev Era* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 150-1.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 154.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 323.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 319, 324.

as a “bleeding wound” as opposed to Brezhnev’s classification of the war as a “hand of imperialism.”<sup>103</sup> Gorbachev could not fully support withdrawal from Afghanistan until he built up enough political power.<sup>104</sup> By February of 1987, Gorbachev critiqued the Soviet foreign policy and the need, not just a desire, to withdraw.<sup>105</sup> In the eyes of Americans, Gorbachev’s domestic reforms of glasnost, perestroika, and new thinking could not be considered viable until Soviet troops left Afghanistan.<sup>106</sup> It was not until April 1988 that the Geneva Accords were signed and the decision to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan was finalized.<sup>107</sup> In the Soviet Union, domestic priorities dictated foreign policy;<sup>108</sup> positive relations with the West were crucial in regard to domestic refurbishment.

Gorbachev not only desired better relations with the United States but Western Europe as well, including West Germany. General Secretary of the GDR, Erich Honecker rejected the reforms that Gorbachev promoted for all of the Soviet Union believing that East Germany did not need to reform its economy.<sup>109</sup> The relations between Honecker and Gorbachev worsened with the introduction of the Common European Home;<sup>110</sup> where would Germany stand in a Common Home? Not only that, Moscow’s improving relations with Bonn, the capital of the FRG, suggested that East Germany would no longer have a special relationship with the Soviet Union.<sup>111</sup> The Soviet Union has had both positive and negative relations with the FRG over the years. Under Chancellor Willy Brandt in the early 1970s, for example, relations were positive. Positive relations were gaining momentum between Moscow and Bonn until 1986, when, in an interview, Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the FRG said, “I don’t consider [Gorbachev] to be a liberal. He is a modern Communist leader who understands public relations. Goebbels [. . .] was an expert in public relations too.”<sup>112</sup> Though it took a while for the statement to be disregarded, but not likely forgotten, Gorbachev realized that improved relations with Bonn were essential to building up the Soviet economy.<sup>113</sup> In October 1987, Kohl visited Moscow and discussed several topics with Gorbachev such as economic relations, the German question, Berlin-Soviet

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<sup>103</sup> Gorbachev and Brezhnev in Mendelson, 350.

<sup>104</sup> Mendelson, 351.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 351-353.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 356.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 355.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 350.

<sup>109</sup> Stent, 52, 55.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>111</sup> Joseph Goebbels was the propaganda minister for Nazi Germany in the Second World War. *Ibid.*

<sup>112</sup> Helmut Kohl, *Newsweek* (27 October 1986): 29, in Stent, 65.

<sup>113</sup> Stent, 66.

Germans, and arms control.<sup>114</sup> Kohl also provided a three billion deutsche mark credit to the Soviet Union and brought fifty businessmen to discuss joint ventures.<sup>115</sup> It is clear that positive relations with the FRG were politically, and economically beneficial for the USSR.

According to Intelligence Agencies for the West German government, Gorbachev assembled four German experts to discuss the German question.<sup>116</sup> According to rumours, two suggestions were being considered: a German-German confederation, or the removal of Soviet and American troops from both states.<sup>117</sup> Although the information was never confirmed, the hopes of the Germans were raised.<sup>118</sup> Angela Stent theorizes that as Gorbachev continued to encourage ties between East and West Germany in his Common European Home, the idea of two German nations became decreasingly viable.<sup>119</sup>

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met at a conference in Reykjavik, Iceland in October, 1986 to discuss foreign policy.<sup>120</sup> In a speech one year later in Murmansk, Gorbachev emphasized the importance of the event in the international arena as “a turning point in world history.”<sup>121</sup> Gorbachev asserted that

it showed a possibility of improving the international situation. A different situation has developed, and no one could act after Reykjavik as if nothing had happened. It was for us an event that confirmed the correctness of our course, the need for and constructiveness of new political thinking.<sup>122</sup>

As early as 1987, Gorbachev recognized his reforms were making a difference and getting the acknowledgement of the United States. Although the summit meeting in Reykjavik fell through at the very end, discussions about arms reductions gained momentum thereafter.<sup>123</sup> Despite reports of U.S. anti-Communist propaganda continuing to circulate, Gorbachev seemed hopeful that

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<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 66-67.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 72. Angela Stent is Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

<sup>120</sup> F. Stephen Larrabee and Allen Lynch, “Gorbachev: The Road to Reykjavik,” *Foreign Policy* 65 (Winter 1986-1987): 3-28.

<sup>121</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, “Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk”, Murmansk, Iceland, 1 October 1987.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

positive relations were possible between the East and the West.<sup>124</sup> At the same meeting, Gorbachev put forth the idea of an Arctic agreement to protect Northern interests; if the Arctic countries like Canada, Norway, and Iceland pool their resources, the Arctic can be a safer, more prosperous, and environmentally friendly place to live.<sup>125</sup> From this speech, it is clear that Gorbachev is working on improving Soviet relations with its neighbours but also the international scene as a whole.

On December 7, 1988, Gorbachev attended the Forty-Third United Nations (UN) General Assembly Session. At the session, Gorbachev articulated his desire to make the Soviet Union more democratic.<sup>126</sup> He outlined various political changes that he had already undertaken, such as amendments to the Constitution and adopting the Law of Elections.<sup>127</sup> He hoped to settle disputes based on the principles of Leninist internationalism and incorporate further reforms domestically and internationally.<sup>128</sup> He planned a dramatic reduction of Soviet forces in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.<sup>129</sup> Gorbachev asked the members of the UN to help him guide the Soviet Union down a path of democratization and human rights.<sup>130</sup> Gorbachev shocked many with his pronouncements as he stated:

[I]t is necessary to seek – and seek jointly – an approach toward improving the international situation and building a new world. If that is so, then it is also worth agreeing on the fundamental and truly universal prerequisites and principles for such activities. It is evident, for example, that force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be instruments of foreign policy. [ . . . ] The compelling necessity of the principle of freedom of choice is also clear to us. The failure to recognize this, to recognize it, is fraught with very dire consequences, consequences for world peace. Denying that right to the peoples, no matter what the pretext, no matter what the words are used to conceal it, means infringing upon even the unstable balance that is, has been possible to achieve. Freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there should be no exceptions.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>126</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, “Address to the Forty-Third UN General Assembly Session,” Speech, 7 December 1988, [http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/gorbachev\\_speech\\_to\\_UN.htm](http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/gorbachev_speech_to_UN.htm).

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

It is clear from his speech that Gorbachev was moving rapidly down a path of reform. His declaration of freedom of choice enabled many nations within the Soviet Union to rebel and call for political independence. He was also very explicit that the use of violence was not a viable option to quell disputes. The ideas in the quoted statement are of paramount importance to the independence movements of the Baltic States as well as the reunification of Germany.

Many people believe Gorbachev's biggest failure to be his underestimation of nationalism.<sup>132</sup> Nationalism is argued to have been one of the main reasons that the Soviet Union collapsed. The Baltic States had wanted their freedom since they were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.<sup>133</sup> Due to the increasing popularity of the ideals of perestroika, nationalist sentiments emerged in 1988.<sup>134</sup> Although the nationalist movements clearly supported Gorbachev's reforms, they wanted autonomy from Soviet leadership.<sup>135</sup> These movements were eventually recognized as prominent factions in society through the outcomes of local elections.<sup>136</sup> For example, in 1989, a large percentage of the Lithuanian Communist party declared their independence from the all-union party; soon after, Communist parties in Estonia and Latvia followed their lead.<sup>137</sup> Early in 1990, the Baltic States considered themselves independent from Soviet control despite the Soviet leadership's saying otherwise.<sup>138</sup> Nationalist movements gained popularity throughout Eastern Europe, partly because of Gorbachev's reforms themselves, partly because of Gorbachev's promise of non-aggression, and partly because of Gorbachev's lack of clarity, initiative, and decisive action.<sup>139</sup>

The reformist atmosphere was palpable all across Europe in the late 1980s. The George Bush Sr. administration in the United States was pushing its Western European allies for German reunification and admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>140</sup> Gorbachev did not want unification and especially did not want a unified Germany to be in NATO.<sup>141</sup> According to Condoleezza Rice, Gorbachev once said that if Germany unified, "there would be a military officer in my chair" which was the fear of many political players at this

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<sup>132</sup> Moss, 472.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 315.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 461.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 464.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 464.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 464.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, 465.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 464; Alexander von Plato, translation from the book *Die Vereinigung Deutschlands - ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Berlin: 2010), "Reunification of Germany and the End of the Cold War" section II, 7.

<sup>140</sup> Rice interview.

<sup>141</sup> Sodaro, 395.

time such as French President François Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.<sup>142</sup> Bush had to work hard to convince Gorbachev that a neutral Germany was impossible.<sup>143</sup> Bush declared that Germany had a right to self-determination, and to choose its own alliance.<sup>144</sup> At the Washington Summit at the end of May, 1990, Bush asked Gorbachev: “It is true that under the Helsinki Accords, which you, the Soviet Union, have signed, that countries are allowed to pick their own alliances. Would you agree that a unified Germany would have the right to pick its own alliances?”<sup>145</sup> According to Rice, Gorbachev was in a bind when this question was posed to him because the Soviet Union did, in fact, sign the accords.<sup>146</sup> Rice presumes “that this formulation helped Gorbachev find a way to accept the fact that a unified Germany was going to a part of NATO.”<sup>147</sup> It was a dramatic moment at the White House when Gorbachev officially told the Bush administration that the Soviet Union would let the Germans decide their own fate.<sup>148</sup> Bush admitted that unification was not in the interest of the Soviet Union and that Gorbachev had to “[take] a big leap of faith [ . . . ] But, they needed things from us, and they, I think they had confidence in Helmut Kohl.”<sup>149</sup>

Many scholars seem to be stymied by the fact that Gorbachev did not fight harder during negotiations of the German question. Condoleezza Rice suggests that the Gorbachev administration did not intervene in German reunification because he “needed Western assistance (financial and other) and he couldn’t really afford to try and stop events. [ . . . ] I think they were in something of a bind.”<sup>150</sup> Not only did the Soviet Union accept aid from the United States, they also accepted billions of deutsche marks in loans and credits before and after German unification from the FRG.<sup>151</sup> The West Germans even helped “meet the GDR commitment” to pay the expenses for the Soviet army to occupy Germany until they could be shipped back home.<sup>152</sup> Germany paid approximately eighty-

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<sup>142</sup> Rice interview. Please see Jacques Attali, interview by Hans-Christoph Bumenberg, 1990, 05:13:27; Charles Powell, interview by Alexander von Plato, London, September 1999.

<sup>143</sup> George Bush, interview by Alexander von Plato, Washington, 14 September 1999.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> Rice interview.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> Bush interview.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>150</sup> Rice interview.

<sup>151</sup> Randall Newnham argues that the Western Germans paid for unification through monetary and supplementary means. See Randall Newnham, “The Price of German Unity: The Role of Economic Aid in the German-Soviet Negotiations,” *German Studies Review* 22/3 (Oct. 1999): 421-446.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 430.

seven and a half billion deutsche marks by the end of their transactions.<sup>153</sup> Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice<sup>154</sup> attribute Gorbachev's unexpected approval of German reunification and admittance into NATO as a weakening of his resolve.<sup>155</sup>

Tuomas Forsberg<sup>156</sup> asserts that there are three possible explanations for why Gorbachev agreed to German unification and its admittance into NATO. Based on the power political theory, Forsberg explains that German membership into NATO was due to the weakness of the Soviet Union.<sup>157</sup> The Soviet Union relied on Western powers to mend their deteriorating economy; the way to earn the support of the West was to allow a unified Germany in NATO.<sup>158</sup> A second theory is based on the alteration of Soviet interests.<sup>159</sup> When Gorbachev implemented his policy of New Thinking, he sought to redefine Soviet identity as a matter of absolutes as opposed to defining it in relation to the West.<sup>160</sup> At the beginning of the confrontation with the West, building military defense was vital to national security; as time went on, however, the confrontation with the West was less likely and the Gorbachev administration turned to economic reform.<sup>161</sup> Furthermore, a unified Germany was beneficial to the Common European Home that Gorbachev promoted.<sup>162</sup> The last and most important theory that Forsberg promotes is the idea of trusting relations between Gorbachev and Western powers, especially West Germany.<sup>163</sup> Although the relations between Gorbachev and Kohl were precarious in the beginning, by the summer of 1989, they began to improve with the meeting between the two in Bonn.<sup>164</sup> Kohl proved his trustworthiness after the fall of the Wall with food aid, a state guaranteed loan, as well as the

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<sup>153</sup> In his estimation, Newnham includes troop withdrawal measures, humanitarian and technical assistance, and credit guarantees and Hermes coverage. *Ibid.*, 437. For more information, please refer to: "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktion der CDU/CSU und F.D.P. (Drucksache 12/5046): Unterstützung der Reformprozesse in den Staaten Mittel-, Südost- und Osteuropas (einschließlich der baltischen Staaten) sowie in den neuen unabhängigen Staaten auf dem Territorium der ehemaligen Sowjetunion," Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6162 (12 November 1993), 61.

<sup>154</sup> Philip Zelikow is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University and Condoleezza Rice is Provost and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University. They were both on George Bush Sr.'s national security staff.

<sup>155</sup> Zelikow and Rice, 279.

<sup>156</sup> Forsberg has a PhD in international politics and is the director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki.

<sup>157</sup> Tuomas Forsberg, "Power, Interests, and Trust: Explaining Gorbachev's Choices at the End of the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 25/4 (October 1999): 608.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 613.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 612-613.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 613.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 616.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, 617.

promotion of economic assistance for the Soviet Union in the European Union (EU) and the G7 meetings.<sup>165</sup>

Although Forsberg discounts the first two theories, and focuses more solely on the third, there is an element of truth in all of them. In his memoirs, Gorbachev said:

I believed that in the new emerging international climate, personal “compatibility” and understanding of your partner’s motives would become increasingly important in world politics. We could achieve such understanding only if we worked together, maintaining regular contacts and mutually comparing each other’s words and deeds. Many difficult issues are far more easily and quickly resolved if there is trust between the political leaders, without unnecessary diplomatic moves and formalities.<sup>166</sup>

It is also apparent that Gorbachev required economic assistance from the West and wanted to transform the politics of the Soviet Union. Forsberg says that Gorbachev’s acceptance of a unified Germany in NATO was the result of a search for shared understandings and trust.<sup>167</sup> That may be so but it was most likely a culmination of all three that led to Germany’s inclusion into NATO as opposed to merely the weakening resolve of Gorbachev.

Not only did Gorbachev have to face economic problems, he also had to contend with social problems within his borders. The independence movements in the Baltic States were quickly gaining favour with the populace and, by 1990 were all but lost to Communism.<sup>168</sup> The Gorbachev administration made concessions for German unification in order to focus on nationalistic problems at home.<sup>169</sup> Alexander von Plato explained that German unification and Lithuanian independence were a “parallel process” and the survival of the Soviet Union was more important to Gorbachev than German unification.<sup>170</sup> The conservatives in the Soviet government were not happy about the price of German reunification but it might have been the only way to secure Western aid.<sup>171</sup> Furthermore, it was clear that by the end of 1989, the Cold War was becoming too expensive and had to be ended in order to aid the people of the Soviet Union.<sup>172</sup> Upon his meeting

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<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 617.

<sup>166</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London: Doubleday, 1996), 519.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 619.

<sup>168</sup> Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 274.

<sup>169</sup> Alexander von Plato, translation from the book *Die Vereinigung Deutschlands - ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Berlin: 2010), “Conclusion”, 415.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 415, 421.

<sup>171</sup> Maier, 274.

<sup>172</sup> von Plato, “Reunification,” 3.

with General Secretary of the Communist Party in Germany, Egon Krenz, in November of 1989, Gorbachev discovered the horrendous state that the GDR's economy was experiencing and took action immediately; the USSR, however, could no longer afford to aid the GDR.<sup>173</sup> The renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was the last piece of the puzzle. Without the threat of violence, the Soviet Union could no longer be considered a major player in world politics; furthermore, both the independence movements in the Baltic States and the East Germans no longer had to live under the threat of oppression.<sup>174</sup> Gorbachev admitted that he no longer had anything the West wanted to exchange during negotiations.<sup>175</sup>

Many of Gorbachev's policies can be described as inconsistent and irresolute. Gorbachev was loyal to the Communist party and did not want to renounce those ties.<sup>176</sup> For that reason, Yakovlev wanted Gorbachev to take action and "manage [the Soviet Union] like a president."<sup>177</sup> Yakovlev knew too that Gorbachev did not have it in him to go against his party and, ultimately, could not be the strong leader that Russia needed.<sup>178</sup> Gorbachev, Yakovlev admitted, became a slave to compromise.<sup>179</sup>

At the beginning of his tenure, until as late as January 25, 1990, Gorbachev rejected German reunification.<sup>180</sup> He knew, however, the poor state of Soviet affairs, domestically and politically. He provided the country with the means to rectify its past mistakes but did not take charge when it all started to disintegrate. In order to help the people in his territory, he had to implement a new policy of democratization. Glasnost and perestroika paved the way for dissidence movements to press for more permanent changes. Gorbachev had to break down the barriers that were holding the Soviet empire in economic stagnation. Gorbachev told the Lithuanian Communist Party in 1990 that "[i]t is politics that follows economics and not vice versa,"<sup>181</sup> German reunification was in the interest of the Russian economy despite its entrance into NATO. Unbeknownst at the time, by helping the people, Gorbachev ultimately undermined the political foundation of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev traded German reunification for better socioeconomic ties with Western Europe. The

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<sup>173</sup> Zelikow and Rice, 87.

<sup>174</sup> Powell.

<sup>175</sup> von Plato "Reunification," 3.

<sup>176</sup> Alexander von Plato, translation from the book *Die Vereinigung Deutschlands - ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Berlin: 2010), "Yakovlev pleads", 90.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>179</sup> Aleksandr Yakovlev, interview by Harry Kreisler, University of California, 21 November 1996.

<sup>180</sup> Sodaro, 394.

<sup>181</sup> Gorbachev in Maier, 79.

Soviet position on German reunification cannot be analyzed separately from the events in the Soviet Union itself; rather, German reunification is an extension of Soviet politics that resulted in a number of different outcomes. German reunification may not have been in the best interest of the Soviet State, but it was in the best interests of the people of Germany, the people of Eastern Europe, and the world as a whole.